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Abstract
This paper studies the regional distribution of the benets from trade in Mexico after NAFTA.
Specically, we ask whether or not NAFTA has increased the concentration of economic activity
in Mexico. Unlike previous work which uses state-level data, we identify the eect of NAFTA on
economic activity at the municipal level allowing us to observe detailed growth patterns across
space. Further, to explicitly identify the eect of the trade agreement, we compare results for
growth in traded and non-traded sectors. Given the spatial nature of these data, we make explicit
use of spatial econometrics methods. We nd that NAFTA caused the wealthy regions nearest
to the border to grow faster than others, increasing regional disparity. Second, we nd that
larger municipalities experienced greater per-capita economic benets from NAFTA. This eect
is particularly noticeable in the north. Somewhat surprisingly, we nd that regions with a less
literate workforce and worse infrastructure grew faster than other areas after the trade agreement,
decreasing regional disparity. We notice these redistributive eects occur primarily in the non-
traded sectors.
Keywords: Regional Disparities, Trade Liberalization, Agglomeration Economies, Economic Growth,
Mexico, Transport Cost, Spatial econometrics
1 Introduction
Economists generally agree that trade will benet a country's economy. However, trade also aects the
location of economic activity (Behrens et al. 2007, Krugman 1991, Hanson 1998a). Particularly for a
country with great geographic disparity, such as Mexico, the distributional eects of trade are at least
as important as the overall eect. Benets of trade were expected to be concentrated mainly in the
northern states of Mexico - due to their proximity to the U.S. market - but empirical evidence is mixed
(Aroca et al. 2005, Krugman & Lizas-Elizondo 1996, Hanson 2001, Rodr guez-Pose & S anchez-Reaza
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2005, Smith 1990). On the other hand, standard trade theory might predict that given Mexico's relative
abundance of low-skilled labor, poorer regions with large pools of unskilled labor might benet more
from the trade agreement. In this paper, we study the distributional eects of NAFTA throughout
Mexico. Specically, we ask whether NAFTA increased the concentration of economic activity in
Mexico.
Mexico has one of the highest rates of income inequality in the world (OECD 2008). Southern
regions of Mexico feel that NAFTA hurt them, to primarily benet northern states.1 \NAFTA did
not reach the South due to obstacles to economic development that aict the Southern states, such
as insucient infrastructure and access to telecommunications services, and social instability and
governance" (Esquivel et al. 2002). Despite anecdotal evidence, there is little empirical work looking
at whether NAFTA made this disparity worse or better.2 Since NAFTA was one of the early bilateral
trade agreements to link a developing country to a large developed economy, its eects may shed light
on the other bilateral trade agreements currently under negotiation. Further, understanding what
caused regions to be harmed by trade might facilitate the development of programs to give regions
better access to this new, large market, or, at a minimum, might allow for targeted compensation.
Although previous empirical studies have analyzed the geographic eect of NAFTA on economic
activity in Mexico, they are limited by using state level data which masks the spatial distribution of
economic activity and severely restricts their number of observations. This paper oers the following
contributions. First, it uses municipal panel data to identify the relationship between trade and
regional patterns of growth. The use of municipal data also provides more observations that could
improve the precision of the estimated impact, since as the sample size grows the estimators converge
in probability to the quantity being estimated. Second, we include the latest economic census (2004)
to observe longer-term eects of NAFTA. Third, by separating economic activity into traded and
non-traded goods, we can better identify the specic eect of trade. Last, unlike previous papers,
we explicitly control for the spatial nature of our data, and use newly-developed spatial panel data
methods (Kapoor et al. 2007).3
We nd that NAFTA has increased the concentration of economic activity in Mexico. Output
of regions near the border has grown faster than those regions further from the United States after
NAFTA, even when these border regions already had high levels of economic activity before the
1Chiquiar (2008) studies wage dierentials in Mexico. He nds that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and international
trade have mostly increased wages in northern states.
2A key exception is Robertson (2000). Considering the eect of NAFTA on wages, he shows that border regions are
more aected by United States labor market than the Mexican interior.
3See also Baltagi et al. (2007) for an application to models of complex FDI.3
trade agreement. Second, we nd that the benets of NAFTA went disproportionately to densely-
populated regions. This eect is particularly notable for cities in the north. Third, as might be
predicted by a standard Heckscher-Ohlin model, we nd that those regions with high rates of illiteracy
benet more from NAFTA. Regions with low levels of infrastructure also improved economically after
NAFTA, implying a redistributive eect of these economic changes. However, mitigating against this
redistributional eect, those regions with a large percentage of high-skilled labour also benet more
from the trade agreement.
When we split the data by sector, we observe that the traded sector, manufacturing, is aected
most strongly by the pull of the border after NAFTA. For the non-traded sector, services, if anything
we see a tendency to redistribute activity further away from the United States. Second, the non-traded
sectors are driving the increased growth in municipalities with lower human capital and infrastructure.
One possibility is that these sectors are moving out of regions where they compete against an expanding
manufacturing sector for labour.
As expected, we nd substantial spatial correlation in the municipal growth rates.
In the next section, we look at the regional distribution of growth in labor productivity before
and after NAFTA. Next, we review the NEG models that suggest which factors might aect this
distribution. Then we present our empirical model, estimation technique and data. Results and
conclusions end the paper.
2 Regional distribution of economic activity in Mexico
Regional income inequality can create severe hardship for those families who are not easily mobile,
and can cause stress on the social structure of a country. Thus, understanding the origin of this
income inequality across and within regions in Mexico is essential for developing policies that can
ameliorate the pervasive high levels of poverty in Mexico. Overall, Mexico has grown rich. Its $1.578
trillion economy is the world's eleven-largest, up from fteenth position 15 years ago. Trade volume
has nearly tripled since the NAFTA, from $52 billion to $161 billion in 2003, placing Mexico ahead
of Britain, South Korea and Spain as a trading power (Smith & Lindbland 2003, Jordan & Sullivan
2003).
Over the same time, the number of poor in Mexico has increased.4 Over half, 54% of the Mexican
population is poor, which is unchanged from the early 1980, but given increase in population from
4According to Jordan & Sullivan (2003) poor are those individuals unable to meet basic needs.4
70 to 100 million over the same period, this means that about 19 million more Mexicans are living
in poverty than 20 years ago. More worrying, about 24 million, nearly one in every four Mexicans,
are classied as extremely poor and unable to aord adequate food (Jordan & Sullivan 2003). Income
inequality and poverty levels in Mexico remain the highest across the OECD. These poverty and income
inequality levels are one and a half times higher than in a typical OECD country and twice as high
as in low-inequality countries, such as Denmark (OECD 2008). Furthermore, most of those who are
extremely poor live in rural areas. As a result between 400 to 600 people a day are packing up and
migrating to cities or to the United States (Jordan & Sullivan 2003).
Economic output varies sharply by region. Following (Chiquiar 2008), we divide Mexico into 5
regions i) the Border Region, being states that border the United States; ii) the Northern Region,
which includes states just south of the Border Region; iii) the Center; iv) the capital (Mexico City and
surroundings); and v) the South (see gure 1).
Figure 2 shows the Gross Value Added (GVA) in real pesos by region. Before and after NAFTA,
most of the GVA has been generated in or near Mexico City, followed by the Border and Center regions.
The Border and Center regions grow more quickly over this period than other regions, while the North
and South lag behind.
Growth of GVA before and after NAFTA is illustrated in gure 3. The map showing growth from
1980-85 (panel a) illustrates a higher number regionally-diverse municipalities with a growth of more
than 100% than in 98-03. In contrast, in 98-03, growth is more concentrated in clusters along the
US-Mexico Border (panel b). Some of the clusters that can be seen in the post-NAFTA map are
Chihuahua, Saltillo, and Monterrey. One can clearly identify the areas of low growth in the south
and more rapid growth in the north. Note that these maps also indicate that growth is by no means
homogenous within a state. Therefore, considering these data by municipality allows us to more
accurately discern the patterns of economic activity.
3 The location of economic activity after trade
In this paper, we ask: What is the distributional eect of NAFTA on Mexico? In particular, we are
interested in whether NAFTA aorded poor regions economic opportunities, or whether the benets
are concentrated in those regions where economic growth was already robust. In the 1990s, a number
of trade economists developed a theory explaining the location of economic activity, called the New
Economic Geography (NEG). We briey review NEG and its prediction for economic activity, particu-5
larly after trade. Next, we present some possible implications of standard trade theory for the location
of benets from trade. We then use these theories to develop several hypotheses about how NAFTA
may have changed the location of economic activity in Mexico.
3.1 NEG Theory
Agglomeration economies are positive externalities that induce the spatial concentration of economic
activity, and these externalities can be aected by trade. Urban economic theory posits that rms
obtain productive advantages from locating in close proximity to other rms and these benets can
explain the formation and growth of cities and industrial locations. The main sources of agglomera-
tion externalities arise from improved opportunities for labor market pooling, knowledge interactions,
specialization, the sharing of inputs and outputs, and from the existence of public goods (Chua 1993,
Vay a et al. 2004). Myrdal (1957) talks about \Circular Causation" or \Positive Feedback" (Arthur
1989), where manufactures tend to locate around a large market, while the market also grows where
manufactures production is concentrated. As the scale and density of urban and industrial agglom-
erations grows, an increase in the external benets available to rms is also expected to be found
Graham (2006). However, these benets are expected to be balanced by the increase in congestion
costs, increase land rent and higher wage rates (Krugman 1991).
New Economic Geography (NEG) theory posits that cities arise because the location of economic
activity is inuenced by market size, transportation cost, and economies of scale (Krugman & Lizas-
Elizondo 1996). Krugman (1991) develops a two-region economy where there is tension between
agglomeration (or the \centripetal" force) arising from economies of scale plus transport costs, while
pressures for dispersion (or the \centrifugal" force) arises from the transport costs to dispersed immo-
bile farmers. He argues that manufacturing rms will try to locate themselves in or near a region with
large demand for their products, but that city size will be limited by congestion costs.
In a later paper, Krugman & Lizas-Elizondo (1996) replace the market demand from immobile,
dispersed farmers by land rent as the source of centrifugal force. They show that in this case, increased
trade can lead to dispersion of economic activity. The intuition is that as a new market arises from
trade, the pull of the existent domestic market diminishes. The domestic center loses the consumers
who can now consume from abroad. They apply this model to Mexico, and show that Mexico City has
lost relevance as a determinant of regional economic growth over time. Further, Krugman & Lizas-
Elizondo predict that the removal of trade barriers will primarily benet for those regions close to the
new market, in our case, those regions closer to the U.S. border.6
In contrast, Paluzie (2001) and Monfort & Nicolini (2000) extend the original Krugman model
by assuming that labor is not internally mobile, and show that trade agreements can increase ag-
glomeration within the country, since as trade in manufacturing increases, regions already with these
manufacturing facilities (i.e. maquiladora hubs in the north of Mexico) will tend to benet more than
other regions. The core dierences between the Paluzie and Krugman models are, rst, Paluzie (2001)
assumes that high land costs and rents are the centrifugal force encouraging dispersion instead of the
demand of dispersed agricultural population. Second, she assumes labor is immobile in the short run.
The result is that once trade is opened up, imports and exports to and from the major cities increase
more than the demand from rural areas (Rodr guez-Pose & Gill 2006).
NEG has a specic focus on the dynamics of growth. Krugman & Venables (1995) mention that as
transport costs fall, or similarly, as trade barriers fall, one should observe convergence in real incomes,
in which poorer peripheral nations denitely gain and core nations may well lose. This theory has been
heavily tested using data from the EU. Barro & Sala-i Martin (1992) nd that within the European
Union (EU), as internal trade barriers fell, regions experienced convergent growth in GDP per capita in
the period 1950-1985. Brakman et al. (2006), nd similar results for the period between 1992 to 2000.
Armstrong (1995) conrms the convergence in the EU for the periods of 1950-1960 and 1960-1970 but
nds less convergence for the periods of 1970-1980 and 1980-1990. When comparing countries within
the EU, Quah (1997) nds that Spain and Portugal, being the two countries with the highest rates
of economic growth in the EU, are also those with the highest increase in regional imbalance. Sala-i
Martin (1996) analyses Spain's regional convergence during the period 1950-1990, and although he
nds convergence during the rst decades, he determines that it fades after 1980. Outside the EU,
Rodr guez-Pose & Gill (2006) nd that among a variety of countries that increased trade from 1980
to 2000 (Brazil, China, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Spain and the U.S.), they observe a general trend
towards economic divergence.
In the two papers that explicitly test for economic convergence in Mexico, empirical ndings are
mixed. S anchez-Reaza & Rodr guez-Pose (2002) nd that those states closer to the U.S. border
grew faster than others before NAFTA, and there was no signicant change in this pattern after
the trade agreement. In this study, Mexico appears to follow a \Core and Periphery" pattern of
economic development during the Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) period (1930s to 1985).
Regional growth was mainly characterized by convergence and linked (1) to the presence of oil and
raw materials and (2) to proximity to Mexico City. However, during the GATT period (1985-1993),
proximity to Mexico City lost its relevance as a determinant of regional economic growth. Thus, they7
nd evidence that the draw of Mexico City lessened after increased international trade, giving support
to the hypothesis of Krugman & Lizas-Elizondo that trade has decreased agglomeration in Mexico.
In contrast, Aroca et al. (2005) do not nd that NAFTA substantially changed growth patterns in
Mexico, and instead argue that agglomeration has emerged in the form of several income clusters. In
particular, they nd that regional disparities result from southern states lagged behind in economic
growth since before the trade agreement was signed. Hanson (1998a,b) argues there has been a cluster
creation along the U.S. border, especially in the manufacturing sector, which has led to the decline
of Mexico City's manufacturing belt since mid-1980s. In a recent paper, Nicita (2009) nds similar
results to Aroca et al. (2005) and Hanson (1998a,b). He estimates how NAFTA has aected living
standards in Mexico through its eect on wages and prices. He nds that richer households have gained
more than poor ones. While poor households also benet from NAFTA, their gains are considerable
lower. He also nds that households in urban areas close to US border are the larger beneciaries
while households in southern state are largely bypassed by the eects of trade liberalization.
3.2 Standard Trade Theory
Along with aecting the strength of centripetal and centrifugal forces, trade likely has a direct eect
on the location of economic activity. As long as inputs are not completely mobile, those regions
with a greater amount of inputs used in export production will presumably gain more from trade
than those regions who are endowed with inputs that most eciently produce import-substituting
products. Assume that we have three inputs: land, skilled and unskilled labor, and three sectors,
skilled-intensive, unskilled-intensive, and non-traded.5 Further, assume that land is immobile, and
labor is not perfectly mobile.6 The standard Hecksher-Ohlin (H-O) model predicts that if Mexico has
an abundant supply of unskilled labor relative to its trading partners, the United States and Canada,
then it will export goods that are \unskilled-labor intensive". Therefore the \unskilled-labor intensive"
goods industry will grow in Mexico and (mobile) unskilled labor in Mexico will benet from higher
wages resulting from this increase in demand for their services. Further, one might anticipate that
regions with abundant unskilled labor will benet more than other areas from trade with the United
States. Last, if the sector using the abundant input has increasing returns to scale, one might anticipate
trade to cause increasing agglomeration, despite the increasing conjestion costs and the decreased pull
of the domestic market.
5We think of capital as completely mobile, and ignore it in this simple notional model.
6Evidence that labour is not completely mobile comes from Chiquiar (2008) who nds little mobility of individuals
across Mexican regions in ve-year intervals surrounding the Mexican trade reforms in the late 1980s and 1990s.8
Combining the NEG and standard trade theory, we get the following hypotheses:
H1: Following Krugman & Lizas-Elizondo, trade will decrease agglomeration
H1a: Alternatively, following Paluzie, Monfort & Nicolini, trade will increase agglomeration
H2: Due to transportation costs, the benets of trade will be greater in those regions closer to the
border
H3: Those regions with an abundance of low-skilled labor will benet
H4: Traded sectors will be more inuenced by NAFTA and distance to the U.S. market than
non-traded sectors
4 Empirical Model
Based on the previous subsections and the information available, we set out a panel data model with
error components that are both spatially and time-wise correlated to explain the change in economic
output over the period 1980-2003.
The general formulation assumes that in each time period t = 1;:::T the data are generated
according to the following model:
yN(t) = XN(t) + uN(t) (1)
where yN(t) denotes an N 1 vector of observations on the dependent variable in time period t, XN(t)
denotes the N  K matrix of observations on exogenous regressors in the same time period,  is a
corresponding K 1 vector of regression parameters, and uN(t) is a vector of disturbance terms. The
disturbance process in each period follows a classical rst order spatial autoregressive process:
uN(t) = WNuN(t) + "N(t) (2)
where WN is an N  N weights matrix of known constants,7  is a scalar generally referred to as the
spatial autoregressive parameters, and "N(t) is a vector of innovations in time period t. To further
allow for the innovations to be correlated over time, (Kapoor et al. 2007) postulate an error component
structure for the innovation vector, that is:
"N = (eT 
 IN)N + N (3)
7In our empirical application we will dene a distance matrix with cut-o at the rst quantile. We also experimented
with dierent spatial weights matrices obtaining similar evidence. Results obtained with dierent W matrices are
available from the authors upon request.9
where N represents the vector of unit specic error components and N = [0
N(1);:::0
N(T)]0 con-
tains the error components that vary both over cross-sectional units and time periods. Finally, eN is
a T  1 unit vector and IN an N  N identity matrix. Note that the specication of the error term
in (3) corresponds to that of a classical one-way error component model as in Baltagi (2008), the only
dierence being the way in which the data are grouped.
(Kapoor et al. 2007) maintain the assumption that the error components it are identically and inde-
pendently distributed with mean zero, variance 2
 and nite fourth moments. The error components
it are also identically and independently distributed with mean zero, variance 2
 and nite fourth
moments. Finally, the two processes are independent. Kapoor et al. (2007) suggest a generalization of
the generalized moment estimator suggested in Kelejian & Prucha (1999) for estimating the spatial au-
toregressive parameter and the two variance components of the disturbance process. These estimators
are then used to dene a feasible generalized least square procedure (FGLS) for the regression param-
eters. Following the classical error component literature, a convenient way of calculating the FGLS
estimator is to further transform the (spatially transformed) model by premultiplying it by INT  Q1,
where  = 1   =1, INT an NT  NT identity matrix and Q1 the standard transformation matrix
well known in the error component literature (properly adjusted to account for the dierent ordering of
the data, Baltagi 2008). The FGLS estimator is then identical to an OLS calculated on the \doubly"
transformed model.
We assume economic growth will be a function of various measures of productivity, such as education
and local infrastructure, transportation costs to the United States, and local market size. We then
test whether the inuence of these variables changed after NAFTA to determine which municipalities
gained and lost from the trade agreement. We rst consider growth (and levels) in overall GVA, and
then split our data into traded and non-traded sectors, to see how the location of economic activity in
traded sectors changed in response to NAFTA in comparison with the location of non-traded sectors.
4.1 Data
We use data from the Sistema Municipal de Base de Datos (SIMBAD) generated by the Mexican
National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Information (INEGI, TABLES, 2005). Specically,
within SIMBAD, we use information from the 1981, 1986, 1989, 1994, 1999 and 2004 economic census
and the 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005 population census. The information on each census
corresponds to data from the previous year.8
8Between the 1980 and 2004 censuses, 65 new municipalities were created. To analyze the same municipalities through
the years, we merged the new municipalities back to their 1980 boundaries. We obtained the list of new municipalities10
To observe how spatial patterns of economic activity have evolved in the dierent regions, we use
the log of the municipal Gross Value Added (GVA).9 We also consider the growth rate, dened as the
dierence in the log GVA. Because GVA nets out the value of inputs from outside the municipality, it
is negative in about 0.68% of the observations. Thus, we took the minimum GVA over all years and
all municipalities and added it as a constant to all productivity levels to ensure we did not lose any
observations.10
Total GVA is calculated as the sum of output of various industrial sectors. When examining the
data, we noticed a sharp change in the GVA of mining from 1980 to 1985, causing a very low correlation
between GVA by municipality from 1980 to 1985 and then again from 1985 to 1988. In conversation
with researchers at INEGI, we learned that the methodology for calculating mining GVA changed in
this period. Therefore, to ensure that this anomaly did not aect our results, we use total GVA net of
mining for the entire period.
For the sectoral analysis, INEGI reports the GVA for manufacturing, commerce and services con-
sistently over our time period. The manufacturing sector is comprised of establishments engaged in
the mechanical, physical, or chemical transformation of materials, substances, or components into new
products. The Commerce sector is dened as rms engaged in wholesaling and retailing merchandise,
generally without transformation, and rendering services incidental to the sale of merchandise. The
service sector is dened as establishments engaged in construction; transportation and warehousing;
producing and distributing information; nance and insurance services; professional, scientic, and
technical services; management of companies and enterprises; educational services; health care and so-
cial assistance; arts, entertainment, and recreation; and accommodation and food services (US 2002).
We argue that manufacturing is clearly a traded sector, producing both exports and import-competing
products. Commerce is less easily dened, since it will act as distributors for both imported and
exported products, but the services it provides are not easily traded. We categorize services as the
non-traded sector.
Figure 4 shows the GVA for each of the sectors. Both manufacturing and commerce increased
their growth rate notably with NAFTA, while services, although increasing, grew at approximately
the same rate before and after the trade agreement
and from where they were created (INEGI 2006). For those created from more than one municipality, we allocate the
new municipality data by the percentage of how many people (or how much land), in the new municipality, were taken
from the former municipalities (information provided by SEGOB 2005).
9GVA are presented in real thousand pesos from 2003.
10GVA is linked to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) since both measure output. However, unlike GDP, GVA does
not include taxes and subsidies on products. This approach is similar to Martin (2001), Fingleton & McCombie (1998),
Fingleton & L opez-Bazo (2006), Esquivel & Messmacher (2002).11
Summary statistics are in the appendix (Table 1).
NEG posits that distance to market inuences the location of economic activity. To capture the
eect of the local market, we include the population density in the municipality, measured in thousands
of people per sq. kilometer. Following Krugman & Lizas-Elizondo (1996), we might expect the
centripetal force may weaken after NAFTA, giving way to the centrifugal force that will make for a
less concentrated urban system.
Also, to observe if Mexico City has lost relevance as a determinant of regional economic growth
over time, we included the variable mexcap, which is 1 if the municipalities are in the Federal District
or in the State of Mexico, which is where most of the concentration of growth has been focus before
the NAFTA (Rodr guez-Pose & S anchez-Reaza 2005).
Given the inuence of the United States market even before NAFTA, we assume growth may be
correlated with transportation costs to the U.S. border, which we proxy by road distance. We generate
by calculating the distance from the capital of each municipality11 (INEGI 2008 April 18) to the closest
border-crossing point (using webpage \Traza tu Ruta" provided by the Secret aria 2008).12
To control for existing infrastructure by using the % of households in the municipality with drainage
(drain). This measure of infrastructure is highly correlated with other variables, such as electricity
and plumbing, and results do not change substantially when we use these other indicators. To capture
productive capacity, we include the literacy rate of the population between 6 to 14 years of age, lit614,
and the percentage of the population with high school, hs, to capture high-skilled labor living in the
municipality. To control for the eect of migration, we include the % of population that reside in a
dierent entity 5 years ago, inmigration.
We would be remiss if we did not include the free-trade zone established by the Mexican government
to produce manufactured goods for the U.S. market before NAFTA.13 This zone was restricted to the
border towns/cities in the northern states of Mexico. These towns/cities are Ensenada, Mexicali,
Tecate, and Tijuana, in the state of Baja California; La Paz in Baja California Sur; Ciudad Acu~ na and
Piedras Negras in Coahuila; Ciudad Juarez in Chihuahua; Agua Prieta and Nogales in Sonora; and
Matamoros, Nuevo Laredo and Reynosa in Tamaulipas (Smith 1990, INEGI 2007,12 13). We include
the annual average number of maquiladora establishments by municipality, ,Estad stica de la Industria
11When one municipality includes more than one city or town, one of them is selected as cabecera municipal (head
city or seat of the municipal government).
12For Municipality heads that do not appear as origin point, we calculate the distance of the nearest available city or
town and add the road distance from that point to the municipality head of interest, which we calculate manually by
using a map of Mexico.
13The maquiladora program is a governmental initiative, created by Mexico and the US in 1965, aimed at attracting
foreign investment in the production of exportable goods, mainly in electronics and garment assembly (Fern andez-Kelly
2007)12
Maquiladora de Exportaci on, (INEGI 2007,12 13).14
We include a dummy variable that equals 0 for periods before NAFTA (1988 & 1993) and 1 for
periods after NAFTA (1999 & 2004). We also interact the various market, distance and productivity
variables with NAFTA to determine which characteristics determined whether a municipality beneted
or lost from the trade agreement.
One issue we had with the data is that the change in GVA per municipality had a few notable
outliers, lying over 10 standard deviations from the mean, resulting in a very peaked distribution. To
ensure that our results were not driven by these outliers, we censored our sample at the rst and 99th
percentile of the distribution each year. This censoring changed 186 observations, and does create a
small mass at each end of the distribution each year. However, while our coecient estimates were
mostly unchanged, our explanatory power improved, and the regression results became more robust
to changes in model specication.
Hypotheses
We use the above data to test the following hypotheses:
H1: Trade will decrease agglomeration.
(a) Specically, we test whether the draw of the domestic market weakens after NAFTA, and
growth is faster in those regions with less dense population.
(b) Second, we test whether transportation cost to the U.S. market is more important after
NAFTA. Specically we test whether those regions closer to the U.S. border grew more
rapidly after the trade agreement.
Since cities and those regions closer to the border were already growing more quickly before NAFTA,
further growth specically in these regions would imply that NAFTA worsened regional inequalities.
H3: Those regions with an abundance of low-skilled labor, measured by a low portion of the population
with high school education, will benet from trade. If Mexico is endowed with low-skilled workers
relative to the United States, we might expect these regions to benet more from trade. Since
these regions tend to be more slow-growing generally, this eect would help mitigate against
regional inequality.
14We use annual average of maquiladoras in 1990 for the period of 1988 since there is no data for 1988.13
H4: Traded sectors will be more inuenced by NAFTA and distance to the U.S. market than non-
traded sectors. Specically, manufacturing, and to a lesser degree, commerce, will see locational
changes as described in H1, while services will either remain in the same location, or perhaps
will move in the opposite direction due to the increased wages and conjestion costs caused by
the growth other industries.
5 Results and Discussion
Table 2 reports the regression results using panel data from 2,377 municipalities over six years (1980,
1985, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 2003). We regress both the level and growth rate of GVA per municipality
against various characteristics and see whether the inuence of these characteristics changed after
NAFTA. We nd substantial spatial correlation in the error terms, particularly for the growth rate
regression, with a  of 0.65. Thus, we believe we are justied in using a spatial panel model.
First, we nd evidence that, as NEG would predict, the eect of the log distance to the border
is signicant and negatively associated with output. Although economic activity is already more
concentrated near the border before NAFTA, the trade agreement reinforced this trend. Specically, a
municipality located a thousand kilometers from the border, like Tonala,15 in the pacic coastal state
of Jalisco had a 7% lower GVA on average than those municipalities along the border (such as Tijuana
and Mexicali; Baja California). After NAFTA, that disparity in output grew to 9%.
We also see this eect reected in the economic growth rates of municipalities. Although munici-
palities closer to the border were not growing signicantly more quickly than others before NAFTA,
they did grow more quickly after the trade agreement. The same municipality 1000 km from the border
grew one tenth of a percent more slowly per year than their counterparts near the border. Thus, the
economic disparity continues to grow since NAFTA was implemented.
Population density also aects GVA. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the higher the population density,
the larger the municipal GVA. However, we do observe a further concentration of economic activity
after NAFTA. Specically, we nd that a thousand more residents per km2 leads to a 7% higher GVA.
For cities at the border, this dierential increases substantially after NAFTA, where a thousand more
people per km2 generates 17% higher GVA.
As with distance, we observe this eect both in levels and in the growth rate of GVA. For a
municipality at the border, an extra thousand people per km2 results in a small .04 percent increase
15Tonala is 1,000.26 km from the nearest border crossing point by road.14
in growth rate overall, but a 0.8 percent annual higher growth rate after NAFTA. By contrast, for the
average municipality, density did not lead to higher growth after NAFTA.
As hinted by the summary statistics in gure 2, we also observe some evidence that the economic
inuence of Mexico City appears to be declining over time. This nding conforms with the Krugman &
Lizas-Elizondo nding that while the US market appears to be increasing in importance, the domestic
market represented by Mexico City is perhaps less important after NAFTA.
Moving to our third hypothesis, NAFTA appeared to benet those municipalities with a larger
fraction of skilled workers, here dened as workers with high school education or more. Although
these municipalities already had higher GVA before NAFTA, they beneted more economically from
the trade agreement than their counterparts with fewer skilled workers. The evidence on low-skilled
workers is more mixed. It appears as if those municipalities with higher rates of illiteracy in their
young population also beneted disproportionately from NAFTA.
Perhaps most striking are the results on infrastructure. We nd that although those municipalities
with better infrastructure, here dened as drainage, had higher GVA overall, after NAFTA, this eect
was almost completely mitigated, with infrastructure having no eect on GVA. Part of this result
might be explained by noting that there was a marked increase in the number of communities with
drainage over this time, going from about 30% of municipalities to 60% after NAFTA. That said,
it is notable that the 40% of municipalities without drainage after NAFTA were no longer lagging
their counterparts in terms of economic performance. These results hold for both GVA level and
growth. Combined with the ndings on literacy, this result seems to indicate that NAFTA was not as
discriminatory as many have thought. We nd evidence that NAFTA appeared to help those regions
that struggle with human and physical infrastructure decits.
We also control for the number of maquiladoras in a municipality, noting that since these regions
already had tari-free access to the United States for some of their production, we would expect them
to be less aected by NAFTA. We do observe a higher level of GVA as well as a higher growth rate
in those municipalities with a larger number of maquiladoras. After NAFTA, however, we see a slight
further increase in the level of GVA associated with maquiadoras, but a signicant decrease in the rate
of growth for those same municipalities. Thus, having a maquiladora in ones municipality is a boon
to growth, but the trade agreement, by reducing taris overall, diused these benets.
Overall, NAFTA appears to have led to both a slightly higher level of municipal GVA but a slightly
slower rate economic growth. Although on its own, the NAFTA dummy indicates that GVA increased
8 percent after the trade agreement, when the other interaction terms are included, we nd that the15
average GVA was only one tenth of a percent higher after the trade agreement. More striking, the
average growth rate is actually one tenth of a percent smaller after NAFTA. Given the peso crisis
which caused a real contraction in Mexican GDP right after NAFTA was implemented, these results
are perhaps not so surprising.
Sectoral Results
We next divide our data into sectors, to compare results for those products more and less likely to be
directly aected by trade. Table 3 presents the sectoral regressions results for output per worker in
the manufacturing, commerce, and service sectors, respectively.
We begin with the sector we expect to be most aected by NAFTA: manufacturing. We see a
similar pattern for manufacturing as we observe in the total GVA regression. Specically, the closer
the municipality to the border, the higher the GVA, and NAFTA substantially increased this distance
premium. In particular, NAFTA had a larger eect on the location of manufacturing than for GVA in
total, increasing the distance-based premium by 50% as opposed to a 10% increase for GVA overall.
Like the total GVA, manufacturing output is larger in more densely-populated urban areas, and
these areas benet more from NAFTA than their rural counterparts. Specically, for municipalities
along the border, the marginal eect of density doubles for manufacturing after NAFTA. Further, the
interaction between density and distance from the border is highly signicant, implying that NAFTA
specically beneted manufacturing in cities close to the border.
Although distance to the border implied increased wholesale and retail activity, this relationship
does not appear to have been signicantly aected by NAFTA, except for more densely-populated
centers. This result is understandable given that we might expect wholesale/retail to be less aected
by trade in general. However, the regression on economic growth rate shows that those municipalities
closer to the border did increase their economic output from the wholesale/retail sector more quickly
after NAFTA. Perhaps these wholesale/retail centers are focused on reselling imports, or facilitating
exports. In contrast, proximity to the US market does not appear to strengthen the services sector
after NAFTA. Although being closer to the border implies a municipality has a larger services sector
overall, this relationship does not demonstrably change after NAFTA. As most services are not traded
internationally, this result is appealingly intuitive. In the regression on growth rates, distance to the
border actually appears to decrease the size of the services sector after NAFTA, although this result
is only signicant at an 11% condence level. The relationship between growth in the services sector
and population density also remained unchanged with NAFTA, unlike the other two sectors. Thus,16
we see notable dierences in the eect of NAFTA among traded and non-traded sectors.
Other notable dierences among the sectors is that while in all three sectors having better human
and physical infrastructure led to a higher level of output overall, NAFTA had very dierent eects
on these relationships. In manufacturing, having a higher portion of the municipality with access to
drainage led to a further increase in output after NAFTA. In other words, municipalities with better
physical infrastructure were better able to benet from increases in manufacturing output generated
by NAFTA than their poorer counterparts. However, the reverse is true for the wholesale/retail and
services sectors. Here municipalities with high levels of drainage saw the benets of that infrastruc-
ture fall signicantly after NAFTA. While municipalities with drainage had an average 10.5 higher
retail/wholesale GVA than their counterparts before NAFTA, that dierence shrank to 3.5 sectoral
GVA after NAFTA. The results for services are more dramatic, with the spread in GVA from drainage
dropping from 20% before NAFTA to only 5% after the trade agreement. Thus, it appears as if
NAFTA disproportionately beneted the non-traded sectors in poorer municipalities.
The dierences for education appear in the regression on growth rates. Having a higher-skilled
workforce is associated with an increased rate of growth in manufacturing and wholesale/retail after
NAFTA. However, it is associated with a lower rate of growth in services after the trade agreement.
One possible explanation is that the service sector was crowded out of these markets by increased labor
demand from the manufacturing and wholesale/retail sectors, which generally have higher wages.
The last notable dierences among the sectors comes from the role of maquiladoras. A maquiladora
leads to higher levels and growth rates of GVA in all three sectors. However, after NAFTA, the extra
GVA from maquiladoras shrinks for wholesale/retail and services. That said, for all three sectors,
the extra growth rate associated with maquiladoras diminishes after the trade agreement. Thus, it
appears as if manufacturing facilities are being set up in municipalities with pre-existing maquiadoras
after NAFTA, but not at the same rate as manufacturing is growing elsewhere. Wholesale/retail and
services appear to be concentrating their expansion elsewhere after NAFTA.
6 Conclusions
The paper studies the regional distribution of the benets from trade in Mexico after NAFTA. This
analysis demonstrates that Mexicos trade liberalization, via NAFTA, has caused important changes in
the location of economic activity. Although regional disparities have existed in Mexico since industri-
alization began in the 1930s (L opez Malo 1960), NAFTA appears to have exacerbated these regional17
trends, concentrating growth in regions that already had larger GVA: specically in the north and in
urban centers.
Thus, we nd that trade liberalization has not reduced territorial disparities, but rather led to
a greater polarization. While Mexican municipalities close to the U.S. market have proted from
integration by increasing their production and incomes, regions further away from the US have become
more disconnected from Mexicos integration into world markets. Specically, we nd that while
NAFTA increased GVA by 7% for municipalities at the border, it actually decreased GVA by 1%
for a municipality in the southern end of the country.
However, north-south disparities are only one part of the story. Counter to popular belief, we nd
that NAFTA appeared to benet those regions with poorer infrastructure, decreasing the gap between
regions without drainage and those with drainage. Similarly, we see some evidence that NAFTA also
lowered the gap between regions with higher rates of illiteracy and those with more literate populations.
Thus, it appears as if NAFTA did have some redistributive eect. That said, regions with a larger
population of highly-skilled workers beneted more from the trade agreement.
Splitting the data by sector gives us some insight into these patterns of economic growth. As
one might expect, we see the largest regional eect of NAFTA occurring in the most traded sector:
manufacturing. While the benets of NAFTA in the wholesale/retail sector are also concentrated in
larger urban centres, the border has a smaller draw overall. Further, the border appears to have, if
anything a repulsive eect for the service sector after NAFTA.
We also see manufacturing being concentrated in those areas with better infrastructure, higher
skilled labour and with maquiladoras after NAFTA. This distribution is dierent for the non-traded
sectors. Specically, it appears as if retail/wholesale are growing faster in regions without maquiladoras
and services in particular are being driven out of regions with high-skilled labour after the trade
agreement. Thus, it appears as if the redistributive eect of NAFTA is coming from a displacement
of the non-traded sectors, while the traded sectors are if anything being concentrated in wealthier
regions.
In summary, we nd evidence supporting the claim that NAFTAs benets primarily went to those
regions already doing well economically. Of particular concern is that these disparities appear to be
increasing even after NAFTA. Thus, if a government objective is to reduce economic disparity, one
can argue that there is a need for redistributive policies to go alongside trade agreements. That said,
regional development policy might try to make use of the fact that non-traded sectors appear to be
willing to move to poorer regions, mitigating some of the economic disparity enhanced by trade.18
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Table 2: Total Gva and growth rate of GVA
Dependent variable: ln GVA growth GVA ln GVA growth GVA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 15.5426*** 0.0036** 15.5142*** 0.0011
(0.0340) (0.0012) (0.0272) (0.0014)
lndist -0.0267*** -0.0005*** -0.0239*** -0.0002
(0.0041) (0.0001) (0.0035) (0.0001)
density 0.0785*** 0.0002
: 0.0730*** 0.0004***




(0.0141) (0.0004) (0.0142) (0.0005)
inmigration -0.2932*** 0.0092*** -0.1093*** 0.0024
(0.0273) (0.0022) (0.0252) (0.0023)
hs 0.7994*** 0.0462*** 0.4260*** 0.0385***
(0.0387) (0.0030) (0.0419) (0.0037)
lit614 0.0252 -0.0023* 0.0373** -0.0014
(0.0160) (0.0010) (0.0139) (0.0011)
drain 0.0398*** 0.0035*** 0.0485*** 0.0059***
(0.0067) (0.0004) (0.0084) (0.0006)
maquila 0.0031*** 0.0001*** 0.0024*** 0.0002***























 0.7679 0.749 0.0384 0.6491

2
v 0.0061 8.50e-05 0.0059 8.42e-05

2
1 0.1184 9.32e-05 0.1131 9.16e-05
 0.7725 0.0454 0.7715 0.0415
Number of time periods 6 5 6 5
Number of municipalities 2377 2377 2377 2377
Total observations 14262 11885 14262 1188524
Table 3: Total Gva and growth rate of GVA for dierent sectors
Manufacturing Commerce Services
Dependent variable: ln GVA growth GVA ln GVA growth GVA ln GVA growth GVA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 15.4865*** 0.0006 13.6509*** -0.0028 12.4018*** 0.0038
(0.0209) (0.0011) (0.0395) (0.0019) (0.0585) (0.0028)
lndist -0.0150*** -0.0002 -0.0229*** 0.0003 -0.0336*** -0.0004
(0.0026) (0.0001) (0.0046) (0.0002) (0.0070) (0.0003)
density 0.0663*** -0.0002* 0.1207*** 0.0014*** 0.1326*** 0.0009***
(0.0020) (0.0001) (0.0036) (0.0001) (0.0046) (0.0002)
mexcap 0.0250* 0.0010* 0.0038 0.0001 0.0064 0.0024*
(0.0114) (0.0005) (0.0191) (0.0006) (0.0253) (0.0010)
inmigration 0.0076 -0.0022 0.1019* 0.0247*** -0.3290*** 0.0097*
(0.0218) (0.0019) (0.0464) (0.0027) (0.0627) (0.0046)
hs 0.2990*** 0.0089** 0.9260*** 0.0607*** 1.3795*** 0.1326***
(0.0381) (0.0034) (0.0807) (0.0043) (0.0986) (0.0074)
lit614 0.0077 0.0004 0.0585* -0.0014 0.1130** -0.0064**
(0.0119) (0.0009) (0.0256) (0.0014) (0.0355) (0.0022)
drain 0.0294*** 0.0027*** 0.1046*** 0.0087*** 0.1965*** 0.0182***
(0.0075) (0.0005) (0.0153) (0.0007) (0.0193) (0.0012)
maquila 0.0018*** 0.0001*** 0.0037*** 0.0002*** 0.0060*** 0.0003***
(0.0002) (1.36e-05) (0.0004) (1.76e-05) (0.0005) (3.02e-05)
nafta 0.0512** 0.0036
: 0.1135** 0.0121*** 0.1301** -0.0028
(0.0174) (0.0021) (0.0384) (0.0029) (0.0483) (0.0053)
nafta*lndist -0.0075*** -0.0004
: -0.0034 -0.0008** -0.0005 0.0008
(0.0015) (0.0002) (0.0034) (0.0003) (0.0046) (0.0005)
nafta*density 0.0707** 0.0045* 0.2913*** 0.0103*** 0.2260*** 0.0042
(0.0237) (0.0022) (0.0506) (0.0028) (0.0613) (0.0049)
nafta*mexcap -0.0122
: -0.0009 -0.0485*** 0.0023** 0.0330* -0.0007
(0.0063) (0.0008) (0.0137) (0.0009) (0.0164) (0.0018)
nafta*inmigration 0.0632 0.0157* 0.4701*** 0.0261*** 0.7281*** 0.0221
(0.0628) (0.0064) (0.1345) (0.0079) (0.1633) (0.0147)
nafta*hs 0.0311 0.0183** 1.6841*** 0.0293*** 2.4846*** -0.0219
:
(0.0533) (0.0058) (0.1149) (0.0070) (0.1385) (0.0131)
nafta*lit614 -0.0104 -0.0018 -0.1642*** -0.0085*** -0.2475*** -0.0007
(0.0163) (0.0019) (0.0354) (0.0023) (0.0433) (0.0044)
nafta*maquila 0.0007*** 4.93e-05** -0.0009** -0.0001*** -0.0017*** -0.0003***
(0.0001) (1.70e-05) (0.0003) (2.00e-05) (0.0004) (3.96e-05)
nafta*drain 0.0118 -0.0019* -0.0690** -0.0051*** -0.1519*** -0.0223***
(0.0073) (0.0008) (0.0155) (0.0009) (0.0185) (0.0018)
nafta*densdist -0.0123*** -0.0008* -0.0412*** -0.0018*** -0.0285** -0.0008
(0.0034) (0.0003) (0.0073) (0.0004) (0.0089) (0.0007)
 -0.3011 1.93e-08 -0.0418 0.8476 0.5331 0.6947

2
v 0.0050 7.64e-05 0.0239 0.0001 0.0344 0.0004

2
1 0.0715 6.38e-05 0.1913 0.0001 0.3464 0.0003
 0.7342 -0.0944 0.6464 0.1515 0.6847 -0.2617
T (time) 6 5 6 5 6 5
N (cross-sections) 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377




































Figure 2: Gross Value Added in real pesos by Region.27
(a)
(b)
Figure 3: Growth of GVA before NAFTA from 1980 to 1985 is reported in panel (a). Growth of GVA
after NAFTA from 1998 to 2003 is reported in panel (b).28
Figure 4: Distribution of the growth rate of GVA by sector (real pesos): manufacturing, commerce
and services.